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Eugene Ch'en, Wang Ching-wei, and the Kuangsi generals; so that the clouds of another serious civil war appeared to be rapidly gathering.
Ratification Article left Outstanding.
62. During my final discussions concerning article 16 with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 27th May, I had been able to secure his agreement to all the minor outstanding points; so that when, after our last meeting on that day, he left for a few days' visit to Shanghai, where he had business to attend to, the whole draft treaty and attached documents had been disposed of, subject to your approval of the formula for the reserved areas, with the exception of the last article 22, containing the provisions for ratification, on which I was still awaiting your instructions. These instructions reached me on the 30th May. You pointed out that the treaty created no legal obligations until it was ratified, and that the conditions on which and the circumstances in which His Majesty's Government would be prepared to ratify being matters within their own discretion, it would be sufficient, to avoid charges of moral bad faith, if we recorded separately at the time of signature the essential conditions for ratification, namely, that His Majesty's Government would have to be satisfied that the Chinese Government were able to give effect throughout China to the terms of the treaty, and that the Chinese Government should equally have concluded agreements for the modifica- tion or abolition of extra-territorial rights with all the other Powers parties to the Washington Treaty of the 6th February, 1922. This reservation could, it was suggested, be placed on record in a unilateral note addressed by me to the Chinese Government at the time of signature, which would not be published, so that we could recede from its terms if we considered when the time came that it was desirable to do so. I placed this proposed solution of the ratification question before the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 1st June. After some pressing Dr. Wang admitted that His Majesty's Government necessarily retained full discretion as to whether they ratified or not, and that the points in question would naturally be taken into consideration when the time for ratification arrived. He objected, however, very strongly to our putting in a written note in the terms proposed, and especially to the second proviso. If the note meant anything at all it would be bound to come out sooner or later, when his position, in having accepted such a note, in the face of his attitude towards the points raised therein, would be an impossible one. He adduced many other arguments why he could not agree to such a proposal, including the argument that His Majesty's Government were in any case covered by the provisions against discrimination in article 18. I pointed out that he could not prevent me putting in such a note at the time of signature, if I was instructed to do so. I reminded him of the similar reservation made in connexion with the ratification of the Weihaiwei Rendition Convention, and illustrated my point by a reference to the present situation as between Nanking and Canton. As regards the second proviso, whatever he might say, the fact remained that China might be unable to enforce jurisdiction over the nationals of certain Powers with whom she had failed to conclude agreements (this produced the usual heated retort that the Chinese Government and people would somehow or other find means for doing so). In any case His Majesty's Government could not possibly forgo a reservation on these points, which would probably be raised in Parliament in the debate on ratification. Eventually Dr. Wang threw out a hint that he would not object to a verbal notification in the sense proposed. As there was nothing to be gained by pursuing the matter further, we left it at that for the moment. Subsequently I received your further instructions that it would be sufficient if, when we came to exchange agreed copies of the draft treaty, I informed Dr. Wang verbally that, under my then existing instructions, I would at the time of the signature of the treaty address him a note in the terms proposed. I informed Dr. Wang accordingly at our interview on the 5th June. He did not seriously demur, and the matter was thus disposed of for the time being.
Maps attached to Article 16.
63. At this interview on the 1st June we also had a brief discussion on the subject of the maps of the reserved areas at Shanghai and Tientsin referred to in article 16. It will be recalled that our original proposals provided for 10-mile 'zones round the custom-houses at the ports in question. This method of handling
the matter was very strongly objected to by the Chinese, not only on account of the area taken in, but also because the idea of zones savoured too much of the Mr. Teichman leased territories and railway zones of the unequal treaties." therefore hit on the ingenious alternative of taking the Chinese municipal areas, which embraced the cores of foreign-controlled settlement and/or concessions as the case might be, the native cities, the suburbs, and considerable surrounding country. The existing Chinese maps of these municipal areas, if accepted by both sides, precluded further controversy and argument as to the areas to be included, and met Chinese susceptibilities by rendering detailed descriptions of the areas in the article itself unnecessary. The Shanghai map, a Chinese map of the municipal area of so-called Greater Shanghai, was accepted without discussion. It embraces an adequate circumference round the International Settlement, the French concession and the Chinese city, and covers both banks of the river and the harbour down to and including Woosung I regard the acceptance of this map as eminently satisfactory. The case of Tientsin was not so simple. I had secured a map of the Chinese municipal area, the boundaries of which are, however, still apparently not definitely fixed. Moreover, an important area to the south of the British concession, embracing part of the race- course road, the racecourse itself, and the county club, where numerous foreigners reside, lies outside the limits of the municipal area as depicted on existing maps. Also the Minister for Foreign Affairs had insisted that the Tientsin area should be more restricted than that at Shanghai, a contention which was intrinsically reasonable. For these reasons the relevant sentence in article 16 had been worded as referring not to the municipal area, but to "the area at Tientsin shown on the attached map. We proceeded to an examination of the Tientsin map which had already been discussed by Mr. Teichman and Mr. Hsu-Mo. I refrained from committing myself, beyond offering the line of the Grand Canal in the North in return for a suitable extension in the South. The upshot of our conversation was that the Minister for Foreign Affairs offered the concessions and ex-conces- I did not sions and an extension to the South embracing the racecourse area.
But in the last resort this, or agree to this, and we may get a little more. something like it, will not be an unsatisfactory solution, since at Tientsin, unlike Shanghai, the foreigners are nearly all concentrated in the concessions and ex-concessions and racecourse neighbourhood, and come and go far more between this area and Peking, Peitaiho, and Tongku, than between it and neighbouring areas of the Chinese municipality. Our original proposal, to include the Naiho to Tongku, had already been dropped. Copies of the two maps in question are enclosed.() On the Shanghai map the proposed reserved area is that coloured yellow, including in the centre the International Settlement and French conces- sion. On the Tientsin map I have drawn a line in ink round the concessions and ex-concessions and the area in the South tentatively agreed to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the case of both maps the boundaries are largely artificial. But we have got to avoid the idea that anyone overstepping the boundary of a reserved area will render himself liable to instant arrest. People will be going in and out of the areas all the time, and both at Shanghai and Tientsin Chinese police will be functioning in a great part of the areas.
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Foreign Office Doubts in regard to Time Limit for Shanghai.
60. In the meanwhile I had received on the 30th May your views on the proposed method of dealing with the Shanghai problem. In this telegram you expressed your concern at the prospect of fixing any time limit for extra- territoriality at Shanghai instead of its simple exclusion from the treaty and reservation for subsequent negotiation. You pointed out that with such a time limit our hands would be tied in securing in the proposed negotiations the safe- guards that we might consider essential; if the future of Shanghai were left open for subsequent negotiation, this would be an added incentive for the Chinese to make the arrangements laid down in the treaty work well, while the actual experience of the working of these arrangements would be a valuable guide as to the safeguards needed in Shanghai. Moreover, the effect of the ten-year limit would be that British subjects in Shanghai would pass under Chinese jurisdic- Even if we had to tion at the very moment that the treaty itself terminated.
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